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X I . D I STI N G U I S H E D PAN E l : S U P R E M E
C O U R T P H I LO S O P H Y O N LA B O R
A N D E M P LO Y M E NT I S S U ES

S u p re m e Co u rt P h i � osop h y o n

La bor a n d E m p i oym e nt i s s u es
THEODORE J. ST. ANTOINE
University of Michigan

It would not take a confirmed cynic to suggest that the title of this
paper amounts to an oxymoron. That soft-hearted but tough-minded
commentator, Florian Bartosic, and his collaborator, Gary Minda,
came close to putting it in so many words: "[T]he Supreme Court lacks
a consistent and coherent theory of labor law" (1982) . My own view is
somewhat different. First, lack of a consistent judicial philosophy is
not all bad; at least it is better than a consistently wrong philosophy.
Second, the vacillating theories of the Supreme Court tend to reflect
the divergent attitudes of American society toward labor over the
years. These are expressed, for example, in the variegated writings of
such scholars as Atleson ( 1983), Bok and Dunlop ( 1970) , Cox (1960),
Northrup ( 1964), Tomlins ( 1985), and Wellington (1968), as well as in
the quite dissimilar policy pronouncements of Congress in the Wagner
(1935) and Taft-Hartley (1947) Acts. Finally, and here I most nearly
agree with Bartosic and Minda, the Supreme Court has at times
exhibited a profound misconception of the values of organized labor
and the lives of ordinary working people, minorities and women in
particular. But in fairness, those instances must be balanced against
others in which the Court has displayed an almost startling insight into
the realities of industrial relationships.
Author's Address: University of Michigan Law School, Ann Arbor, Ml 48109-1215.
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It is not enough for our highest appellate tribunal to reach even
right results in individual cases. Principled decision making is essential
for the guidance of the lower courts and the administrative agencies.
Sometimes that will mean overriding collective or union values, but at
least those values deserve to be understood. My aim in this paper is to
examine several illustrative decisions to demonstrate what I believe is
a distressing confusion about basic principles and values. I shall first
look at cases dealing with union-management relations and then at
those dealing with employment discrimination and affirmative action.
Un ion-M anagement Relations

Strikes, Picketing, and Boycotts

Three years ago, in TWA v. Flight Attendants ( 1989), the Supreme
Court ruled that at the end of an economic strike, an employer could
retain employees who worked during the strike and not replace them
with striking employees who had greater seniority, just as it could hire
new "permanent replacements" from outside. In so holding the Court
placed American labor law at odds with the law or practice of Western
Europe and with the International Labor Organization's latest
interpretation of its guarantee of Freedom of Association (1991 ) . Yet
the TWA decision is but a modest and not illogical extension of the 50year-old precedent of Mackay Radio ( 1938), which first established an
employer's right of permanent replacement. Mackay and TWA can be
seen as trampling over incumbent employees' hard-earned equity in
their jobs, and as dismissing union people's long-standing, deep-seated
aversion to strikebreakers, or "scabs." But what could be more in the
American grain than the individualistic belief that the employer is
entitled to enlist anyone's aid-and promise permanent employment
as an inducement-to keep its operations running? In thus elevating
individual over collective values, the Court was arguably right in tune
with the mind set of the 1980s.
To ask someone to make a lawful, independent, and totally
uncoerced decision not to patronize a particular business would
appear unexceptionable, and constitutionally protected as well. But if
that self-same message, the better to be seen, is placed on a large sign
and carried around, as is the working person's wont, it is no longer an
appeal to "reason" but instead a "signal" calling for an "automatic
response" and hence subject to prohibition. So declared the best
reasoned of several opinions supporting the majority position in
Safeco (1980) . The holding was that a union violated the secondary
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boycott provisions of Taft-Hartley by picketing to urge consumers not
to buy a particular primary product that constituted the major sales
item of a neutral distributor. The badly flawed opinion of the Court
did no more to meet First Amendment objections than to cite earlier
decisions dealing with picketing addressed to union members. Wholly
ignored was the important distinction between an appeal to a group,
acting in accordance with group loyalties and even group discipline,
and an appeal to individual members of the consuming public, acting
in accordance with their own individual lights.
As if to underscore its downgrading of picketing as a means of
communication, the Supreme Court was prepared in DeBartolo II
(1988) to engage in some strained statutory construction in order to
avoid constitutional questions and sustain the legality of handbilling
asking customers not to shop at any of the stores in a mall where a
nonunion builder was operating. Apparently picketing, organized
labor's traditional mode of appeal and protest, falls into an entirely
different category from handbilling and other methods of communi
cating. Regardless of its peacefulness, its location, or the lawfulness of
its message if conveyed by another means, picketing may be treated as
coercive per se and lose the First Amendment protections afforded
other forms of speech.
Just when one is beginning to wonder whether the Court disdains
the values most prized by the labor movement, along comes a line of
decisions that looks very much in the opposite direction. In the
National Woodwork ( 1967) and Longshoremen ( 1985) cases, the Court
overrode the literal boycott language of Taft-Hartley and upheld work
preservation clauses even though they seriously impaired technologi
cal innovation and productive efficiency in the construction and
maritime industries. At the forefront of the Court's analysis was the
primacy accorded free, voluntary collective bargaining, which has
long occupied an honored place in the Court's pantheon. Perhaps it is
that "free, voluntary" aspect of union-management negotiations which
makes collective bargaining so attractive to a number of Justices. As
we shall see next, however, even this relatively favored institution has
its definite limitations.
Collective Bargaining

Over the past three decades, the most controversial issue regarding
the scope of the duty to bargain has been the extent to which
employers must negotiate about managerial decisions that result in a
shrinkage of employee job opportunities. Under the Kennedy Labor
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Board a wide range of managerial decisions were reclassified as
mandatory subjects of bargaining. The Warren Court's Fibreboard
decision ( 1 964) , dealing with the in-plant subcontracting o f
maintenance work, gave qualified approval t o this development. But
the Burger Court took a different tack in First National Maintenance
( 1981 ) . Although the peculiar facts of FNM could narrow the
significance of its holding, the case was described by the Court as
involving "an economically motivated decision to shut down part of a
business." The Court held, with only Justices Brennan and Marshall
dissenting, that the employer did not have to negotiate with the union
about that determination.
In FNM the Court first declared that a proposed subject must be
"amenable to resolution" through collective bargaining. Then came a
balancing test. Bargaining over a managerial decision would be
required only if the "benefit, for labor-management relations . .
outweighs the burden placed on the conduct of the business." As the
dissenters rightly objected, this supposed balancing tilted the scales
against legitimate employee interests. It also ignored the increasing
body of empirical data that union and employee input may greatly
enhance the quality of management decision making. FNM was
plainly a retrogressive movement in the Supreme Court's labor
philosophy.
If FNM was a backward step, Connell (1975) was a headlong
retreat. The Supreme Court held that a union lost its federal antitrust
immunity when it sought and obtained an agreement from a general
contractor that the latter would subcontract mechanical work only to
firms that had a current contract with the union. For my purposes, the
most significant aspect of the Court's decision was its characterization
of the union's action as an attempted exclusion of potential business
competitors from the subcontracting field, a matter of product market
and antitrust concern. Surely most industrial relations experts would
see the union's action as an effort to organize nonunion firms, a matter
of labor market and labor law concern. Fortunately, in the subsequent
Woelke & Romero case ( 1982) , the Court limited Connell and held
that a union was entitled to get a union-only subcontracting clause as
long as it had a regular collective bargaining relationship with the
employer. Connell remains important, however, in showing how
critical rna y be the lens through which the Justices view a problem: is
it a labor issue, or something else?
One aspect of collective bargaining has always been held in high
esteem by the Supreme Court, namely, the provision for final and
.
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binding arbitration of disputes between unions and employers. In part
the explanation may be that arbitration implements one of the Courfs
most fervently espoused values, industrial peace. In part the
explanation may be that arbitration saves the federal judiciary from
what could be the crushing burden of adjudicating claims under more
than 100,000 collective bargaining agreements across the country. At
any rate, the Court in the Misco case (1987) did not even stop short of
enforcing an arbitral award reinstating a discharged employee, despite
the employer's contention that the award violated public policy by
putting back on a dangerous paper-cutting machine a worker who had
been fired for smoking marijuana.
Race and Sex Discrimination

The Concept of "Discrimination"

Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act forbids an employer or a
union to "discriminate" in employment because of an "individual's
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." The legislative history
made clear that Congress was out to eliminate the classic form of
discrimination-intentional, malicious, malign disparate treatment
excluding minorities and women from desirable positions and equal
benefits in the work force. In Griggs v. Duke Power Co. ( 1971), a
unanimous Court spoke through Chief Justice Burger and added a
whole new dimension to the concept of discrimination. An employer
had excluded a substantially larger percentage of blacks than whites
from certain jobs because the blacks lacked high school diplomas and
scored lower on standardized tests. The Court held that, regardless of
the employer's intent, the use of a job qualification would violate Title
VII if it had a disproportionately adverse impact on a protected group
and could not be shown to be a business necessity in its relation to
performance of the job in question.
Later, in the Manhart case ( 1978), the Court stressed that Title VII
focused on "fairness to individuals rather than fairness to classes." The
Court went on to hold that female employees could not be required to
pay more than male employees to help fund a retirement annuity
providing equal benefits for males and females, even though women
on the average live longer than men and it thus costs more to provide
benefits for them. Many individual women, the Court pointed out, will
not live as long as the average man. But this emphasis on the individual
as a critical element in defining discrimination, helpful as it was in
resolving the Manhart issue, would reveal some distinct deficiencies in
other contexts, as the Court soon discovered.
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Affirmative Action

The most sensitive and difficult problem in employment discrimi
nation is that of affirmative action, or conscious race and gender
preferences in hiring, promotions, layoffs, and other job determina
tions. The theory, of course, is compensation for past discrimination.
The rub is that the individual beneficiary is often not an identifiable
victim of that past discrimination, and the individual displaced is often
innocent of any participation in the dis crimination as well.
Nonetheless, in the Weber case (1979), a 5-to-2 majority of the Court
sustained under Title Vll a private, voluntary on-the-job training
program that reserved 50 percent of the openings for blacks until the
percentage of black craftspersons in a plant approximated the
percentage of black workers in the local area. The Court observed that
the plan was adopted to eliminate persistent patterns of racially
segregated jobs. Accordingly, the plan was in keeping with the very
purpose of Title Vll, and it would be "ironic" if it were outlawed by
"a law triggered by a nation's concern over centuries of racial
injustice."
While Justice Brennan emphasized on behalf of the Weber
majority that the evident purpose of Title Vll was to improve the lot
of those formerly excluded from the mainstream of American
employment, he said nothing about the abundance of legislative
history indicating that the means chosen by Congress to achieve this
objective was "color blindness." Similarly, there was no reference to
Manhart's insistence that Title Vll protects individual rights rather
than group rights. White complainant Brian Weber, who had greater
seniority than some of the black employees selected for the training
program, could fairly claim that he as an individual was being
deprived of a place because of his race. The Court was not above
manipulating concepts of group versus individual justice to reach
desired results. Finally, and most significantly, there was no attempt
by the Weber majority to come to grips with the crucial statutory term,
"discriminate."
This is not to say that Weber was wrongly decided. It is to suggest
that the majority could not agree upon a coherent, convincing
rationale of the sort that united the Warren Court in Brown v. Board
( 1954) , the landmark school desegregation decision. I sympathize with
Justice Brennan's tactical problems in fashioning his fragile majority in
Weber. I still believe, however, that more could have been done to
bolster the intellectual appeal of the opinion. For example, the
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meaning of "discriminate" has evolved, so that it now connotes, not
simple line drawing, but malign line drawing to someone's detriment
or disadvantage. More important as a practical matter, the 15 years of
exerience following the passage of Title VII in 1964 had demonstrated
the naivete of some of its assumptions. "Color blindness" was not
going to produce equality or even equal opportunity for groups long
subject to deprivation and degradation. The socioeconomic reality of
the position of minorities in our society, and in certain key respects of
women as well, cried out for more positive steps. Finally, the Weber
majority did not even mention that the U.S. Senate, in adopting the
comprehensive revisi on of Title VII contained in the Equal
Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, twice rejected by 2-1 margins
proposed amendments that would have expressly forbidden
affirmative action by both government and private parties.
The departure of Justices Brennan and Marshall leaves the future
of affirmative action in considerable doubt. The Supreme Court's last
major endorsement of preferential treatment, this time on the basis of
sex, was I ohnson v. Santa Clara (1987), decided 6-to-3 under Title VII.
Justices Scalia, Rehnquist, and White dissented, with all three calling
for the overruling of Weber. In the Croson case (1989) , which struck
down an extreme form of city-mandated affirmative action as a
violation of equal protection under the Constitution, Justice Kennedy
joined the majority in applying the "strict scrutiny" test on the grounds
that race is a suspect classification even if used for a "benign" purpose.
Newly appointed Justice Thomas has been an announced foe of
affirmative action in the past. It is therefore possible that five votes are
now available to overrule Weber, regardless of how Justice Souter
might go. But precedents as significant as Weber are not lightly
overturned, and the Court has generally seemed more tolerant of
private affirmative action, subject only to Title VII, as distinguished
from public plans, subject also to the Constitution.
Conclusion

The Supreme Court's labor philosophy is a crazy quilt. It often
downplays cherished worker values, like collective action, and modes
of expression, like picketing. At the same time it embraces other union
priorities, such as work preservation and dispute settlement through
binding arbitration. Similarly, the Court has wavered irresolutely in
sorting out the various worthy but competing interests at stake in
affirmative action programs. To an extent this ambivalence may
simply reflect the pragmatic approach of most American problem
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solving. There may also be a healthy attentiveness to factual
differences in particular situations. In certain areas, however, with
affirmative action the paramount example, one can only conclude
sadly that there has been a dearth of moral leadership. At its best, as in
Brown v. Board, the Supreme Court serves as the conscience of the
nation, and we are the less when it shirks that function.
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